Abstract This paper is a critical reflection on the notion of dynamic consistency that is commonly used in the literature in Economics and Decision Theory and on the difficulty to test it in an experimental set up. Building on the possible characteristics of individual dynamic preferences, we propose a conceptual categorisation of possible sequential decision making behaviors. In particular, we show that not conforming to Expected Utility Theory does not necessarily implies a violation of dynamic consistency and propose a simple set of decision tasks that allows to reveal different strategic types of resolution of a sequential decision problem by a non-expected utility maximizers.
outcomes. The result of this first step can be represented by a traditional decision tree containing more than one decision node. The second step consists in determining a course of action, i.e. which option to choose at each decision node. We call such a sequence of successive choices a strategy analogously to the game theoretical concept. The standard way to determine a solution for this second step, is to reason recursively by starting from the terminal node of the tree and folding back up to the root of the decision tree. The application of the Backward Induction (BI) procedure determines a preferred option for each node, and identifies thereby an optimal strategy for the sequential decision problem. While, in this paper, we do not dispute the first step, we will question the second one. Even though an individual might "solve" the sequential decision problem by relying on backward induction, once he is engaged into the decision problem he might find himself in a position where he wants to deviate from the initially chosen strategy. An agent who finds himself in such a position does not satisfy dynamic consistency (or consistent planning behavior introduced by Strotz, 1955) which requires that the planned course of actions coincides with the realized course of actions i.e. a strategy that is chosen at the beginning of a sequential decision problem can be executed automatically -or implemented by a surrogate to whom the plan is delegated for it's execution -since it is supposed that the decision maker always agrees with the decision chosen at every node that might be reached while the decision problem unfolds, whether it is chosen by a surrogate, a computer program, or by himself 1 .
This coincidence of planned and realized actions is an intrinsic characteristic of the strategy to which we will refer as Strategic Dynamic Consistent (SDC) in the remainder of this paper. SDC is a property that is frequently violated: procrastination, addiction and time inconsistency are popular examples of such violations. Violations of SDC arise primarily because of weakness of will (Elster, 1985; Elster, 2000; Ainslie, 2001; Benabou & Tirole, 2004) and of changing preferences. An individual who is unable to correctly anticipate his future preferences when choosing his current action might end up selecting a strategy that is sub-optimal at a future decision node as seen from the point of view of his future preferences once he has discovered them. Changing preferences (see for example Bradley, 2009 ) often arise with elapsed time as documented by the literature on hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1992; Laibson, 1997) and is a case that we do not consider in this paper. But SDC can be violated by an individual even if his preferences are stable over time.
Indeed, when evaluating future options, one can misrepresent his own preferences and therefore wrongly think that he will make a choice at a future decision node that is in fact not consistent with his real preferences. Consequently, such an individual might choose a strategy that he is not able to implement at some future decision node and thus violate SDC. An individual that behave according to this description in a sequential decision problem will be called naïve 2 in the remainder of this paper. It as been argued in the literature that a naïve behavior could occur for agents that do not verify the independence axiom of Expected Utility Theory and might end up implementing a strictly dominated strategy violating SDC (see for example Hammond, 1988; Seidenfeld, 1988; McClennen, 1990) .
Agents who satisfy the axioms of EUT (called EU types thereafter) are not subject to this rationality trap. They satisfy SDC because the strategy they select by applying backward induction reasoning is immune to any reevaluation inconsistencies. However, agents who do not satisfy the axioms of EUT do not necessarily rely on backward induction to solve sequential decision problems and do not necessarily satisfy SDC. In this paper, we propose a general way to analyse how Non-Expected Utility agents (non-EU types) deal with sequential decision problems. We define a non-EU type as an agent whose preferences violate the independence axiom. Descriptively this type could be thought as an agent whose preferences are represented by the Rank Dependent Expected Utility model 3 (RDU). In a dynamic set up a violation of the independence can have several origins.
We rely on the decomposition of the independence axiom (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Wakker, 1999) presented in figure 1 and on the theorem of Karni & Schmeidler (1991) , to define a non-EU agent in a dynamic framework as an agent whose preferences violate one of the following so-called way. Each of the dynamic axioms is testable within the revealed preference paradigm because they 2 Unlike a myopic individual, a naïve individual is able to project himself at future decision nodes. He just uses preferences in order to predict his future choices that do not correspond to the actual ones. We recall that his preferences are stable over time, so the reason of this calibration error could be thought as a problem of positive introspection.
3 or Cumulative Prospect Theory if losses are involved. 4 Under the assumption that only one dynamic axiom can be violated at the same time.
Scaled up problem
Prior lottery problem Two stage problem rely on decision problems involving a unique decision node 5 (Cubitt et al., 1998; Nebout & Dubois, 2012) .
As presented in figure 1 , violations of independence can be attributed to three distinct reasons:
-The inability of the individual to exhibit indifference between a compound lottery and the corresponding reduced lottery. Such an agent does not satisfy the reduction of compound lottery axiom.
-The dependence of an individual's current preferences on the past resolution of uncertainty which led him to the current choice situation. Instead, an individual who focuses exclusively on future outcomes when taking his current decision in a dynamic decision problem is "neutral towards background history" (or background uncertainty) and is defined as satisfying consequentialism. In contrast dependence on forgone uncertainty is defined as non-CON. This concept of CON is exhaustively discuss in Machina (1989) .
-The fact that an individual's current preferences are influenced by the timing of resolution of uncertainty when making a decision in a dynamic decision problem. This means that the resolution of uncertainty has an intrinsic informational value that can modify an individual's choice depending on the fact that the decision has to be taken before or after the resolution of this uncertainty. An individual who is not neutral towards the timing of resolution of uncertainty does not satisfy dynamic consistency. DC is a key dynamic axiom because it allows the use of backward induction reasoning for solving sequential decision problems 6 . Indeed if DC is not verified, an individual who ought to choose at the beginning of a sequential decision problem does not know if he shall use his actual preferences prior to the resolution of an uncertainty or his future preferences after the resolution of uncertainty that do not correspond to his actual ones.
For the latter axiom the terminology "dynamic consistency" is critical and might explain why DC and SDC are often confounded in the literature. We believe that they ought to be distinguished from a conceptual point de view: DC characterizes an individual's dynamic preferences whereas SDC is a behavioral property of the strategy. Although intuition suggests that the two notions are closely related, DC does not imply SDC and SDC does not imply DC.
On one hand, any violation of one of the three dynamic axiom by a naïve agent might induce violation of SDC. This may occur if he solves a sequential decision problem without taking into account the fact that his preferences do not satisfy the violated dynamic axiom (and therefore acts as if he were an EU agent 7 ). Combining the fact that an agent is naïve with the violation of one of the dynamic axioms provides three types of naive agents that violate SDC: DC-naïve, CON-naïve and RCL-naïve 8 .
On the other hand there exist non-EU agents that are aware that their preferences violate the independence axiom and more specifically which of the three dynamic axioms. Such agents who are able to anticipate a potential violation are called sophisticated and we can distinguish three sophisticated types depending on the dynamic axiom that is violated : RCL-sophisticated, CONsophisticated and DC-sophisticated 9 (Rabinowicz, 1995) . These agents, in contrast to the naïve ones, succeed in satisfying SDC because they can take into account the consequences of their non-EU preferences over their choices at future decision nodes. Let us briefly sketch the behavioral strategy underlying each sophisticated types :
First, for RCL-sophisticated agents, we rely on the sequential consistency hypothesis of Sarin & Wakker (1998) combined with standard backward induction reasoning. Sequential consistency guarantees that the agent uses the same family of non-EU models at each decision node of the 6 DC could be compared to the dynamic feasibility condition in Seidenfeld (1988) . 7 This naïve behavior might be due to unawareness of violation of the dynamic axiom or impossibility to use this information when dealing with a sequential decision problem.
8 Note for example that A CON-naïve agent verifies DC but violates SDC. 9 We will see that sophistication takes a slightly different sense in the case of Non-DC agent. Note however that a sophisticated agent who violate DC may well verify SDC. One can think at the Ulysses example here. sequential decision problem. With this behavioural hypothesis backward induction is well suited to extend non-EU models to sequential decision problems so as to maintain SDC.
Second, a CON-sophisticated agent can still verify SDC in a sequential decision problem. He needs to apply a type of backward induction reasoning that takes into account the influence of the future forgone uncertainty on his preferences. We call such reasoning Generalized Backward Induction.
Finally by relaxing DC, there is an inadequacy between the decisions of the agent at the current decision node and at the future decision node because the resolution of uncertainty between these two nodes will have a non-neutral influence on the preferences. In this case, we use the concept of a "multiple-self" agent each of which may have different preferences for a given decision node. A DC-sophisticated type is therefore likely to behave according to two different rules-of-thumb first described by McClennen (1990) .
The sophisticated type anticipates a possible inconsistency given his violation of DC and therefore chooses her current plan accordingly to avoid any inconsistency by searching the Nash equilibrium of a multiple-Selves game (Karni & Safra, 1990 ) which corresponds to a non-cooperative strategy.
Note that this strategy is also obtained by the use of backward induction reasoning.
The resolute type follows a cooperative strategy between his future "selves" (Nielsen & Jaffray, 2006) in order to maximize their joint utility. This strategy can be obtained by excluding from the set of feasible strategies, the one that correspond to the naïve or the sophisticated types and to choose from this set the strategies that are not stochastically dominated.
To sum up, this classification of types of strategy relies on a classification over the individual dynamic preferences and on notion of awareness of the characteristics of this preferences by the agent. This is the prize to pay to categorize each strategy in term of adequation with SDC. All these notions are summarized in table A of appendix.
In fact, the aim of this paper is to propose a way to identify behavioral strategies in a sequential decision context. Indeed, it has always been a great challenge for behavioral economists and psychologists to observe and characterize strategies in an experimental context 10 . For example, one explanation of the difficulty to study SDC in laboratory experiment is well described by Hey & Lotito (2009) : "If one simply asks the subject what he or she is planning to do, then, unless one forces the subject to implement that plan, there is no incentive for the subject to report any plans honestly; moreover, asking them such a question raises in the subject's mind the idea that they possibly ought to plan. Furthermore, if one insists that the subject implements the 10 whether it be in Decision or Game Theory plan that he or she has stated, then one changes the nature of the problem from a dynamic problem to a pre-commitment problem".
In this paper, we propose an experimental paradigm that takes as premises the characteristics of the dynamic preferences in order to draw conclusions over the type of strategies used in sequential decision problem. Our goal is to be as close as possible to some "revealed strategies paradigm". First we distinguish EU from non-EU types. While EU types satisfy both DC and SDC, non-EU types satisfy SDC if they are sophisticated and violate SDC if they are naive. However, there exists a rich variety of non-EU types depending on the dynamic axiom that is violated and whether individuals are aware or not of their inconsistency. This makes the identification exercise of behavioural types far from trivial.
Our paper proceeds as follows. 2 provides some notations and formal definitions of three dynamic axioms we previously introduced. It also discusses in more details the relationship between the use of backward induction for solving sequential decision problem, different behavioral types we identified (naïve and X-sophisticated) and the strategic behavior (SDC or not). 3 presents a general experimental paradigm that allows for categorizations of the different behavioral types we identified. 4 discusses some limitations and possible extensions of our work.
Background

Notation and dynamic axioms
Notation
In order to present the different hypotheses of individual dynamic behavior we introduce minimal theoretical notations. First, let X be an arbitrary set of monetary outcomes, and ∆(X) the set of all simple probability measures on the algebra of all subsets of X. We refer to elements of ∆(X)
as single stage lotteries and to elements of ∆(∆(X)) as two-stage lotteries.
For instance element A = (x 1 , α; x 2 ) ∈ ∆(X) is the lottery which gives the outcome x 1 with probability α and x 2 with probability 1 − α and for A, B ∈ ∆(X) , (A, α; B) ∈ ∆(∆(X)) is the two-stage lottery which gives lottery A with probability α and lottery B with probability 1 − α.
For A, B ∈ ∆(X) , αA + (1 − α)B ∈ ∆(X) is the standard mixture of A and B which is the reduced one stage lottery derived from (A, α; B) by the rule of calculus of conditional probabilities.
Following the notations used by Machina (1989) we shall also introduce the set ∆(∆(X)) of twostage lotteries where the risk involved in the first stage lottery is already borne,i.e the objects of choice are elements of ∆(X) knowing that a first stage risk is already resolved. For A, B ∈ ∆(X), (A,α; B) ∈ ∆(∆(X)) represents the one stage lottery A knowing that the prior lottery (A, α; B) has already been realized and that A has been obtained with probability α. The key of this notation is to take into account a risk that "is gone in the sense of having been consumed not in the sense of irrelevant." (Machina, 1989) .
We assume that an individual has a preference ordering over the set G = ∆(∆(∆(X))) 11 and which, assuming appropriate condition of continuity, can be represented by a preference function
To sum up, to αA + (1 − α)B ∈ ∆(X) corresponding to the probability mixing of A and B, we add two new kinds of objects that characterize the probability mixture operation:
and (A, α; B) ∈ ∆(∆(X)) and provide enough richness to decompose the independence axiom into three dynamic axioms.
Dynamic axioms
The use of non-EU models in a dynamic framework and its predictions in term of sequential decisions have been normatively discussed in the theoretical economic literature. The main puzzle of this literature relies on the decomposition of the independence axiom in three dynamic conditions, namely dynamic consistency, consequentialism and reduction of compound lotteries. Those three conditions have been argued to be normatively appealing (Machina, 1989) , however when the independence axiom is violated, one and only one 12 of them is also violated (Karni & Schmeidler, 1991 , Volij, 1994 . In our formal framework, these axioms are defined 13 as follows and are graphically synthesized in table 1. First we define the independence axiom then the dynamic axioms:
Axiom A3: Independence For every A, B, C ∈ ∆(X), and ∀ α ∈ [0, 1]:
By degenerating the lottery of the first stage or the forgone lottery it is easy to see that ∆(∆(X)) ⊂ G and that ∆(∆(X)) ⊂ G 12 Formally, Violations of one and only one dynamic axiom is equivalent to violation of independence. In this study, we will not be interested in the simultaneous violations of more than one dynamic axioms although Nebout & Dubois (2012) find experimental evidence of such violations. 13 The frameworks of Hammond (1988) and McClennen (1990) are more general and apply to objects that are strategies in sequential decision problem (i.e. which contains more than one decision node). Consequently, the definitions of the dynamic axioms we propose do not exactly correspond to their use of the same terminologies.
We commit ourself to the two-stage interpretation of the probability mixture operator and want to account for the fact that the timing of resolution of the first stage risk is an important component of this axiom. We therefore define three additional axioms that ought to be satisfied if independence does.
Axiom A3 − 1: Consequentialism (CON)
For every A, B, C ∈ ∆(X), and ∀ α ∈ [0, 1]:
As explained earlier CON would be false if missed opportunities, regrets, sunk costs, etc. affected
behaviour and yet were excluded from the domain of consequences. We argue that CON means that choice behavior should not be influenced by a risk already resolved. If CON is abandoned, then behavior is affected by events that are known not to have happened at the moment of decision and therefore involves counterfactual reasoning about outcomes that could have occurred but are revealed not to.
If preferences towards two stage prospects do not differ whether the risk involved at the first stage is resolved or not a the time of decision, then DC is verified. This definition only concerns dynamic preferences towards objects that differ only with respect to the timing of resolution of their first stage risk.
Axiom A3 − 3: Reduction of Compound Lottery (RCL)
Given these definitions, it is straightforward that if A31-A32-A33 are satisfied then independence holds. It has also be shown that:
-If RCL and CON hold then DC ⇔ IND. (Karni & Schmeidler, 1991) -If RCL and DC hold then CON ⇔ IND. (Volij, 1994) -If DC and CON hold then RCL ⇔ IND. (Volij, 1994) Therefore, if only one of the three dynamic axioms can be violated at the same time and if IND is violated, then one and only one dynamic axiom is violated. This is illustrated in figure 1 where each violation of a dynamic axiom is a possible extension of the violation of independence in a dynamic format (Wakker, 1999; Nebout & Dubois, 2012) . So, any violation of the independence axiom has its dynamic violation counterpart. The isolation effect uncovered by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) is the first experimental investigation of decomposition of the independence axiom in a dynamic set up 14 . Cubitt et al. (1998) first provided experimental data on the rate of violations of each dynamic axiom. They used a between-subject set up, tested the axioms for a unique set of lotteries {A, B, C, α} and found a high rate of rejection of DC. Nebout & Dubois (2012) present an experiment that reproduces their design but in a within subject manner and with different outcomes levels and two different ratios, i.e. α, levels. Their main findings are that violations 15 of DC and RCL are influenced by the ratio level whereas for CON the outcomes level seems to be the relevant variable to consider.
Backward Induction and sequential decision making
An EU agent verifies all three dynamic dynamic axioms and could deal with a sequential decision problem using the Backward Induction (or folding back) procedure, henceforth BI ( Raiffa, 1968 , Sarin & Wakker, 1994 . This consists in apprehending a sequential decision problem by the end and replacing the last decision node by the certainty equivalent of the preferred prospect. Then the agent proceed the same way with the antepenultian decision node and recursively until the root decision node. For an EU agent, this procedure selects an unique optimal strategy. LaValle & Wapman (1986) demonstrated that the classic rolling back procedure relies on the independence axiom. However, we follow the path opened by Hazen (1987) showing that this reasoning procedure may also be applied to non-EU agents in an extensive form analysis. Hereafter, we present how BI can be used by non-EU agents depending of their behavioral types and dynamic preferences characteristics.
Backward induction procedure for -Naïve agents.
A naïve agent violates one dynamic axioms but is not aware of this deviation from EUT. Thus, when determining his optimal strategy in a sequential decision problem, he acts like an EU agent and use BI. However, he wrongly considers that his preferences verify the dynamic axiom he is in 14 Independence is decomposed into CON and DC+RCL in the isolation effect. 15 We mean violation in the direction of CRE when we speak of violations here.
fact violating. Consequently, the optimal strategy he will choose at the beginning of the decision tree, is likely not to be implemented at each decision node where his anticipated preferences may not correspond to actual ones.
A DC-naïve wrongly considers that his preferences are not influenced by the timing of resolution of uncertainty and may therefore choose an option prior to the resolution of uncertainty that will no longer be the preferred one after resolution of uncertainty. At this point he will therefore revise his initial anticipated choice.
A CON-naïve does not take into account the influence that forgone uncertain events has over his preferences.Latter in the problem he can found himself in a situation where he has to change his initially anticipated choice because the resolution of a particular event had an unanticipated impact over his preferences.
A RCL-naïve uses backward induction and reduce compound probailities to solve sequential decision problem. He therefore do not take into account the fact that he is not neutral indifferent between a multiple stage prospect and its reduced single stage counterpart. by using RCL He might end up revising his initial strategy 16 .
In conclusion, most of the time, naïve behavioral types do not verify SDC. In the next section, we argue that in order to verify SDC, a non-EU agent need to be sophisticated (i.e. aware of the dynamic axiom he does not verify).
Backward induction procedure for CON-and RCL-sophisticated agents.
In this section we argue that BI is extendable to an agent whose dynamic preferences satisfy DC but is either CON or RCL-sophisticated and therefore non-EU. Indeed,when using BI. only DC is necessary to replace the preferred option at a decision node by its certainty equivalent. When DC is not verified, this replacement implicitly changes the timing of resolution of uncertainty concerning the choice that has to be made at this node. Therefore, a condition for BI to be used as a tool to compute the optimal solution in a sequential decision problem and to verify SDC is that the agent dynamic preferences verify DC. Non-EU agents verifying DC violate either RCL or CON and allows us to define the following two types -RCL-sophisticated. Sarin & Wakker (1998) proposed the sequential consistency condition which guarantees that the agent uses the same family of non-EU models at each decision node of the sequential decision problem. If verified, there exists a well defined certainty equivalent at each decision node which represents the preferred prospect and BI procedure can be implemented to solve sequential decision problem.
-CON-sophisticated 17 . We propose a generalization of Backward induction procedure which takes into account the non neutrality toward foregone risk by such agents (see appendix C). In this case certainty equivalent replacement procedure applies on elements of ∆(∆(X)).
DC-sophisticated agents and sequential strategies.
For a DC-sophisticated agent, the use of BI is not possible. To escape this difficulty, a conceptual stream of thought initiated by McClennen (1990) investigated the behavioral strategies of DCsophisticated agents by the mean of "multiple selves" models. Two distinct behavioral types were identified for this kind of agents:
-The sophisticated type adopts a non-cooperative strategy among his multiple "selves". In this case, the sequential decision problem is represented as an extensive form game in which the agent is considered as a different "self" at each decision node. Karni & Safra (1989) suggested the idea of behavioural consistency where DC-sophisticated agents chooses a best -response strategy in a multiple-selves game. To do so he uses standard backward induction reasoning and selects a strategy that is a Nash equilibrium between selves in the extensive form game. Karni & Safra (1989) apply their concept to a finite ascending bid auction game and search models. Hammond (1989) and Machina (1989) highlighted that this strategic behaviour might however end up selecting a strictly dominated strategy.
-The resolute type adopts a cooperative strategy among his multiple "selves" in order to avoid to choose a dominated strategy. He is therefore aware of this eventual drawback of the sophisticated reasoning. Nielsen & Jaffray (2006) state the following weak rationality assumption in order to define the resolute type: "A decision maker is rational if his behavioural rule can never make him choose a first order stochastically dominated strategy". Under this assumption, a resolute type chooses at each decision node from the set of undominated strategies.
18 . This criterion of resoluteness is therefore a negative condition that does not guarantee either existence nor uniqueness of the resolute strategy. In this chapter, we also exclude from the set of admissible strategies for the resolute type the one that could be selected by a DC-naïve agent or by a sophisticated agent even if they are not dominated.
To sum-up, whatever behavioral type is considered (naïve or sophisticated) for non-EU agent, the reasoning mode used to solve sequential decision problems relies on BI. However depending on the awareness of the agent concerning his dynamic preferences, this process might end up in selecting a strategy that is either SDC or not.
Revealed categorizations.
This section presents an experimental paradigm 19 which enables to reveal the individual behavioral types in the solving of a simple two-decision sequential decision problem. We propose two categorizations that rely on three decision problems and allows, in the first case, to distinguish between the non-DC types and in the second case between the non-CON 3.1 Main categorization.
In this section we focuss on the non-DC types and first test for violations of DC. As presented in figure 1 , this is made by analysing the joint choice pattern at an individual level in a prior lottery and a two stage problems.
The test of DC is therefore implemented with the use of the two decision tasks of figure 2 where the following one stage lotteries have been used : A = (x 1 , q), A * = (x * 1 , q), B = (x 2 , 1), C = (1, 0) ∈ ∆(X) where x 1 > x * 1 .
In P 1 , the choice U 1 (resp D 1 ) reveals that V (A, r; C) > V (B, r; C) (resp V (A, r; C) < V (B, r; C)).
In P 2 , the choice U 2 (resp D 2 ) reveals that V (A * , r; C) > V (B, r; C) (resp V (A * , r; C) < V (B, r; C)). Note that a subject choosing
After this categorization in terms of DC, we propose the problem P 3 presented in figure 3 . This problem is sequential because it may involve two successive choices. At the decision node 1, subject has the choice between the two options U and D. If he chooses D, the problem is finished but he chooses U , there is a probability r that he reaches decision node 2 where options U − U and U − D 19 We are deeply indebted to Jean-Yves Jaffray who first suggested the idea of such a categorization. 20 We are well aware that [D 2 /U 1 ] choice pattern might be consistent with DC, given that x 1 > x * 1 , however we can always choose an arbitrary small ǫ with x * 1 = x 1 − ǫ such that [D 2 /U 1 ] reveals violation of DC.
Prior lottery problem (P 1 )
1 − r Fig. 2 Experimental test of DC.
are available. These potential two choices confer to the problem its sequential essence and implies that the observed choices in such problem can be interpreted as revealed strategies. This sequential decision problem is very similar to the one used in the philosophical literature in order to illustrate the resolute and sophisticated behaviors (McClennen, 1990; Rabinowicz, 1995; Gauthier, 1997) . Subjects' answers to these three independent decision problems allow us to make the following propositions with regards to dynamic preferences, behavioral types and strategic behaviors:
Proposition 1 Suppose that an agent uses BI and is EU or RCL-Sophisticated. If he chooses -DC-Naïve, if he chooses U − D in the sequential decision problem.
Proposition 2 Suppose that an agent uses GBI and is CON-Sophisticated. If he chooses
-Sophisticated if he chooses D in the sequential decision problem.
-Resolute if he chooses U − U in the sequential decision problem.
Proposition 5 Suppose that an agent is non-DC. If he chooses [D 2 /U 1 ] in S 1 /S 2 then his behavioural type is determined as follows :
-DC-Naïve, Resolute or Sophisticated if he chooses U − U in the sequential decision problem.
-Resolute if he chooses U − D in the sequential decision problem.
P P P P P P P P P 1 /P 2 . This comes from the fact that our design ended up with the same prediction in P 3 for these two categories.
-Second, the naïve, resolute and sophisticated non-DC types act the same way under the conditions of proposition 5 whereas they choose different strategies under the conditions of proposition 4. Therefore, our categorization gains its maximal discriminative power in the case of violations of DC revealed by D 1 /U 2 . In the complementary categorization, we propose a way to distinguish between non-DC types in a case of violations of DC revealed by U 1 /D 2 .
Finally, the predictions of table 3 correspond to the characteristics in term of SDC proposed in table 2.
P P P P P P P P P 1 /P 2
Indeterminate SDC − Table 2 Characteristic of the strategy for each pattern of choices.
Proof of proposition 4
Because this is a key feature of our categorization, we present the proof 21 of proposition 4. It stands on logical assertions and conceptual interpretations of resoluteness, naivety and sophistication. It could be useful to present in a more formal manner 22 the notions we introduce previously in this paper.
This proposition characterizes the behavior in P 3 of a non-DC agent having revealed preferences for D 1 /U 2 in P 1 and P 2 and corresponds to the third line of table 3. Depending of the agent behavioral type, it will produces three distinct choice patterns:
i. First we consider the case of naïve agent. He is non-DC because he chooses the pattern
in S 1 /S 2 but he is not aware of this inconsistency when he deals with sequential decision problem and uses backward induction reasoning.
Therefore when evaluating the strategies U − U and U − D from the point of view of decision node 2 (i.e. prospects (A, r; x 3 ) vs (B, r; x 3 ), he think he will end up choosing U − U because he is not aware of the fact that he chooses D 1 in S 1 .
To finish his reasoning, he should now compare strategy U − U with strategy D given that :
Using FOSD and RCL, V (U − U ) > V (D). So the naïve agent maker will choose Up at decision node 1 thinking he is implementing strategy U − U , but after the resolution of the prior risk, he will in fact choose Down at decision node 2 (as revealed by his choice of D 1 in S 1 ).
→ the naïve agent ends up revealing behavioral strategy U − D
ii. We pursue with the case of the sophisticated agent. He is non-DC because he chooses the pattern
To resolve the sequential decision problem he uses backward induction reasoning taking into account the fact that his preferences are Non-DC. When looking at 21 The other propositions' proofs are available in the appendices. 22 We assume static first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) in the whole proof.
decision node 2, he is aware of the fact that he will choose D given his dynamic preference (D 1 in P 1 ). So he knows that the behavioral strategy he will implement if he chooses U at decision node 1 will be U − D.
To finish his reasoning, he should now compare strategy U − D with strategy D given that :
The choice of U 2 in P 2 reveals that V (B, r;
the point of view of decision node 1.
→ the sophisticated agent ends up revealing behavioral strategy D
iii. The last type is the resolute agent. It is the more refined one. He is non-DC and conscious of his inconsistency. However, he is likely to force and bind himself to fight against this inconsistency 23 .
Using backward induction reasoning and taking into account his inconsistency he knows he will end up choosing the behavioral strategy of the sophisticated agent which is dominated.
So he chooses Up at decision node 1 to escape this rationality trap, then he chooses Up at the decision node 2 (even if he revealed a preference for D there by choosing D 1 in P 1 ) to restore an internal consistency with the fact he did not choose D at decision 1 which would have been optimal if he were to choose Down at decision node 2.
→ the resolute agent ends up revealing behavioral strategy U − U.
Complementary categorization
As discussed in the previous sections, there are two over four choice patterns in [P 1 /P 2 ] that were not discriminative in terms of revealed strategies in P 3 . In this section we present an alternative set of choice problems that deal with the kind of behaviors not handled in the previous categorization.
The principle is the same than in the main categorization but here the dominance hypothesis, characterized by x * 2 < x 2 , is put on the sure lottery. As in 3.1, the following one stage lotteries have been used : A = (x 1 , q), B = (x 2 , 1), B * = (x * 2 , 1), C = (1, 0) ∈ ∆(X) where x 2 > x * 2 . In these problems, we are specifically interested in the choice patterns Prior lottery problem (P *
)
Two stage problem (P * 2 )
1 − r Fig. 4 Experimental test of DC.
V (B, r; C) > V (A, r; C). and V (A, r; C) > V (B, r; C). For these two types of agent, choices in the following P * 3 are associated to the following categorization.
P P P P P P P P P * 1 /P * 2 The proofs of this categorization are identical in the reasoning to the one of propositions 2 and 4 and are therefore left to the attention of the reader. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we conceptually distinguish between two notions of dynamic consistency that are often confounded in the experimental literature in Economics and in Psychology. If Philosophers directly refers to dynamic consistency as a property of "plans", this terminology has also been applied to dynamic preferences in Decision Theory. In this paper, we argue that these two definitions are not equivalent. Then, we build a conceptual categorization over this distinction (DC vs SDC).
To this end, we define a general concept of sophistication that takes into account the awareness of a non-EU agent that he does not verify the independence axiom and more precisely one of the three dynamic axioms : CON, DC, or RCL. We show that this type of agent might verify SDC if he is sophisticated, i.e he takes into account the characteristics of his non-EU preferences when determining his optimal strategy at the root of a sequential decision problem.
Using these definitions, we propose an experimental protocol that allows to categorize each type of non-EU agent depending on the dynamic axiom he violates and on the level of sophistication he demonstrates when solving the sequential decision problem. Given the fact, that subjects might have more than one decision to make in the sequential decision problem, our protocol is outside the scope of the revealed preference paradigm and should be considered as revealed strategy paradigm.
However, we use a minimal theoretical framework using as objects of choice, single decision situations since we aim to be consistent with the revealed preference paradigm when empirically testing each of the three dynamic axiom. This framework is sufficient to demonstrate that our categorizations reveal sequential strategies although it is less general than the ones of Hammond (1988) or Kreps & Porteus (1978) . This is due to the fact that we wanted our preferences relation to be defined on single decision lotteries and not on a strategy set 24 . The core of our arguments relies on the use of backward induction reasoning and we agree with Hazen (1987) rather than with LaValle & Wapman (1986) that the recursion analysis of decision trees in extensive form does not require independence.
As McClennen (1990)'s case study and other analysis in the literature, we restrict our analysis to a two by two sequential decision problem (two decision and two nature nodes) since our main concern in this paper is to propose a categorization that is testable empirically. Therefore, we leave its generalization to n by n decision problems for further theoretical work using the concepts exposed in this paper.
We preferred to refine our conceptual analysis to the two possible directions of violation of a dynamic axiom. Indeed, the main categorization applies to violations of the three dynamic axioms in the same direction than the one exhibited in the common ratio effect whereas, in the complementary categorization, we focuss on violations in the reverse common ratio effect direction. These two different protocols are complementary and useful since Nebout & Dubois (2012) show that dynamic axioms can be violated in both directions depending on the parameters of the dynamic problems. Now, experimental investigation should provide us with data in order to determine which behavioral types are the most common for each categorization and in which theoretical directions we shall dig deeper.
Appendices
A Conceptual summary B Machina's Classification Machina (1989) provides another an extension of the static violation of the independence axiom by using the common consequence effect. However he ends up with a categorization of individuals that is similar to ours:
-α − people who are Expected utility maximizers and whose underlying preference verify independence and therefore separate in all aspects.
-β − people who are Non-Eu maximizers and CON Such individuals are Non-DC.
-γ − people who are Non-Eu maximizers and Non-CON. Such individuals are DC Another category of people studied by Machina is the one of the dynamically consistent nonexpected utility maximizers who use the backward induction (or folding back) reasoning process in order to determine their optimal strategy in a sequential decision problem. They are called δ − people and Machina argues that that the use of this procedure is not normatively defendable in the case of non-expected utility maximizers.
We agree with Machina's criticisms. However, we want to go further in our study of the γ − people and propose general kind of folding back procedure which could escape these normative criticisms and seems to have a good descriptive power.
C Generalized Backward Induction
If a CON-sophisticated agent is aware of the influence of forgone event on his preferences, he takes it into account when implementing the folding back procedure. More precisely, the folding back procedure is in general thought to apply at each decision node on elements of ∆(X), here we consider a procedure which apply at each decision node to elements of ∆(∆(X)).
Let take the example of sequential decision display in figure 2 25 and how a Con-sophisticated agent applies global backward induction procedure to this problem:
-First, the agent looks at decision node 3 where he has to choose between A and B. He knows that his choice will be influenced by the resolution of the prior lottery, therefore to determine which prospect he will choose at node 3, he has to evaluate (A, r 2 ; C 2 , 1 − r 2 ) versus (B, r 2 ; C 2 , 1 − r 2 ) rather that A versus B. Let say he prefers (A, r 2 ; C 2 , 1 − r 2 ) and note EC 2 the certainty equivalent of this prospect.
25 all three decision nodes tree (3*3 trees) can be represented in this form when assuming RCL. E -Then at decision node 2, the agent replaces (using folding back procedure) the upper branch by EC 2 and therefore has (by the same reasoning than in decision node 3) to evaluate prospects
. Let say he prefers this last prospect and note EC 1 its certainty equivalent.
-Finally, the individual arrives at the actual decision (decision node 1) and have only to choose
there between E and EC 1
Remark: It could be argued that this procedure does not take into account the possibility for the course in the decision tree to end up in C 1 or C 2 . Actually it does as soon as the decision maker is dynamically consistent because in this case he does not make any difference for the uncertainty to be resolved prior or after his decision. (i.e. prospects (A, r 2 ; C 2 , 1 − r 2 ) and (B, r 2 ; C 2 , 1 − r 2 ) are ranked the same way than (A, r 2 ; C 2 , 1 − r 2 ) and (B, r 2 ; C 2 , 1 − r 2 ).
D Proof of the propositions
In the dynamic problems three one stage lotteries have been used : A = (x 1 , q), A * = (x * 1 , q), B = (x 2 , 1) ∈ ∆(X) ( x 3 = 0 in all these lotteries).
For X ∈ ∆(X), we denote c(X) ∈ X the certainty equivalent of lottery X which mean that (c(X), 1) ∼ X. For the sake of simplicity we will write that (c(X), 1) = c(X) ∈ ∆(X) (therefore here c(B) = x 2 ).
Let us now describe what the choice patterns between P 1 and P 2 revealed in term of preference functional:
-Choosing U 1 in P 1 means that U 1 ≻ D 1 which reveals that : V (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r) > V (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r).
-Choosing U 2 in P 2 means that U 2 ≻ D 2 which reveals that:
V (A * , r; x 3 , 1 − r) > V (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r).
Proof of Proposition 1:
The agent we are interested in in this proposition is either EU or Non-RCL, therefore he satisfies both CON and DC and use BI.
i. Let us prove that if he chooses [U 1 /U 2 ] in P 1 /P 2 , this agent has to choose U − U in P 3 .
First choosing U 1 in P 1 reveals that V (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r) > V (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r).
Assuming CON it also reveals that V (A) > V (B) (i.e. A ≻ B) and so that c(A) > c(B).
If he chooses U at the first decision node, the agent knows that he will end up choosing the strategy U − U by CON and BI,
To finish his reasoning, he compares strategy U − U with strategy D given that :
→ (c(A), r; x 3 , 1 − r) ≻ (A * , r; x 3 , 1 − r) by DC.
ii. Let us prove that an agent who chooses
First choosing D 1 in P 1 reveals that V (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r) > V (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r).
Assuming CON it also reveals that V (B) > V (A) (i.e. B ≻ A) and c(B) > c(A).
If he chooses U at the first decision node, the agent knows that he will end up choosing the strategy U − D by CON and BI,
To finish his reasoning, he compares strategy U − D with strategy D given that :
The choice of D 2 in P 2 reveals that V (B, r;
Proof of Proposition 2:
The agent we are interested in this proposition is Non-CON, therefore he satisfies both RCL and DC and uses GBI as he is sophisticated.
i. Let us prove that an agent who chooses [U 1 /U 2 ] in P 1 /P 2 , chooses U − U in P 3 .
First choosing U 1 in P 1 reveals that V (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r) > V (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r) → c(A, r; x 3 , 1 − r) > c(B, r; x 3 , 1 − r). If he chooses U at the first decision node, the agent knows that he will end up choosing the strategy U − U by using GBI,
. by FOSD and RCL.
ii. Let prove that an agent who chooses
First choosing D 1 in P 1 reveals that V (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r) > V (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r) → c(B, r; x 3 , 1 − r) > c(A, r; x 3 , 1 − r).
If he chooses U at the first decision node, the agent knows that he will end up choosing the strategy U − D by using GBI,
And V ([(B, r; x 3 , 1 − r), r; x 3 , 1 − r]) = V ((B, r; x 3 , 1 − r)) by DC
The choice of D 2 in P 2 reveals that V (B, r; x 3 , 1−r) > V (A * , r; x 3 , 1−r) therefore
26 Without DC we could make an additional hypothesis to prove our result : 
Proof of Proposition 3:
The agent we are interested in this proposition is Non-CON, therefore he satisfies both RCL and DC. However, he is naïve and therefore use BI as if he was EU.
i. Let us prove that such an agent who chooses [U 1 /U 2 ] in P 1 /P 2 , chooses D in P 3 .
First choosing U 1 in P 1 reveals that V (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r) > V (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r). However, because he is Non-CON for these prospects he also prefers B to A, so V (B) > V (A). If he chooses U at the first decision node, the agent knows that he will end up choosing the strategy U − U by using BI,
from the point of view of decision node 1.
→ the CON-naïve agent ends up revealing behavioral strategy D.
ii. Let us prove that such an agent who chooses
First choosing U 1 in P 1 reveals that V (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r) > V (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r). However, because he is Non-CON for these prospects he also prefers A to B, so V (A) > V (B). If he chooses U at the first decision node, the agent knows that he will end up choosing the strategy U − U by using BI, because because V (U − U ) = V (c(A)) > V (c(B)) = V (U − D).
-V (U − U ) = V (c(A), r; x 3 , 1 − r) = V (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r)
-V (D) = V (A * , r; x 3 , 1 − r)
Using FOSD and RCL, V (U − U ) > V (D). So the naïve DM maker will choose Up at decision node 1 thinking he is implementing strategy U − U , but after the resolution of the prior risk , he will in fact choose Down at decision node 2 (as revealed by his choice of D 1 in S 1 ).
→ the CON-naïve agent ends up revealing behavioral strategy U − D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
i. First let consider the case of naïve agent. He is Non-DC (here he chooses the pattern [D 2 /U 1 ] in S 1 /S 2 ) but he is not aware of this inconsistency when he deals with sequential decision problem by using backward induction reasoning.
Therefore when evaluating the strategies U − U and U − D from the point of view of decision node 2 (i.e. prospects (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r) vs (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r)), he think he will end up choosing D because he is not aware of his inconsistency (the fact he chooses U 1 in S 1 )
To finish his reasoning, he should now compare strategy U − D 3 with strategy D given that :
-V (U − D) = V (B, r; x 3 , 1 − r)
So the naïve DM maker will choose Up at decision node 1 thinking he is implementing strategy U − D, but after the resolution of the prior risk he has to choose at decision node 2, he will in fact choose U (as revealed by his choice of U 1 in S 1 ).
→ the naïve agent ends up revealing behavioral strategy U − U
ii. Let pursue with the case of the sophisticated agent. He is Non-DC (he chooses the pattern [D 2 /U 1 ] in S 1 /S 2 ) and he is aware of it. To resolve the sequential decision problem he uses backward induction reasoning taking into account the fact that his preferences are Non-DC.
So, when looking at decision node 2, he is aware of the fact that he will choose U given his dynamic preference (U 1 in P 1 ). So he knows that the behavioral strategy he will implement if he chooses U at decision node 1 will be U − U.
-V (U − U) = V (A, r; x 3 , 1 − r)
Using FOSD and RCL, it is clear that V (U − U) > V (D).
→ the sophisticated agent ends up revealing behavioral strategy U − U The last case is the one of the resolute agent. He is Non-DC (he chooses the pattern [U 1 /D 2 ] in S 1 /S 2 ) and he is aware of his inconsistency. However, he is likely to force and bind himself to fight against this inconsistency. Using backward induction reasoning and taking into account his inconsistency he knows he will end up choosing the behavioral strategy of the sophisticated agent U − U.
Here, as there is no problem of domination of the behavioral strategy of the sophisticated agent, the resolute agent can choose between the two undominated strategies U − U and U − D whether it is the present self who has the negotiation power (U − D) or the future self (U − U). 
